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Static applied general equilibrium (AGE) models have 
been used extensively over the past 20 years to analyze 
government policies in both developed and less developed 
countries. (See, for example, Shoven and Whalley 1984, 
1992.) Not surprisingly, static AGE models were also the 
tools of choice when researchers began studying the po-
tential impact of the North American Free Trade Agree-
ment (NAFTA) on the Canadian, Mexican, and U.S. econ-
omies (Francois and Shiells 1994). In another article in 
this issue, we examine some specific applications of static 
AGE models to NAFTA. Here, though, we try to describe 
the basic structure of AGE models and give some sense 
of their reliability. 
In this article, we construct a simple model and use it 
in a series of examples to explain the structure of static 
AGE models. We then extend our model to include in-
creasing returns to scale, imperfect competition, and dif-
ferentiated products, following the trend of AGE modeling 
over the last 10 years. We also present an example that 
provides some clues about the reliability of these models. 
Our example compares a static AGE model's predictions 
with the actual data on how Spain was affected by enter-
ing the European Community (EC) between 1985 and 
1986. We find that, at least when exogenous effects are 
included, a static AGE model's predictions are fairly reli-
able. 
But these models are not perfect. One reason static 
AGE models have been so popular is that they stress the 
interaction among different industries, or sectors. Because 
they emphasize the impact of reallocating resources across 
sectors of an economy, these models are good tools for 
identifying winners and losers under a policy change. They 
fail to capture the effect of a policy change on the dynam-
ic aspects of an economy, however. A policy change such 
as NAFTA is likely to directly affect dynamic phenomena 
such as capital flows, demographics, and growth rates. 
Here, we merely indicate that, good as they are, static AGE 
models have their limitations. In our other article in this 
issue, however, we present some preliminary results which 
demonstrate that dynamic modeling of the effects of a 
policy change like NAFTA is an area of research that de-
serves more attention. 
Basics 
Like any economic model, an AGE model is an abstrac-
tion that is complex enough to capture the essential fea-
tures of an economic situation, yet simple enough to be 
tractable. Our model is a computer representation of a na-
tional economy or a group of national economies, each of 
which consists of consumers, producers, and possibly a 
government. The consumers in the computer model do 
many of the same things their counterparts in the world 
do: They purchase goods from producers, and in return, 
they supply factors of production. They may also pay tax-
es to the government and save part of their income. 
To analyze the impact of a change in government poli-
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cy with a static AGE model, we use the comparative stat-
ics methodology: We construct the model so that its equi-
librium replicates observed data. We then simulate the pol-
icy change by altering the relevant policy parameters and 
calculating the new equilibrium. Performing policy experi-
ments is obviously less costly in a computer economy than 
in the world economy. But the ultimate value of the pro-
cedure depends on how well the model with the simulated 
policy change predicts what would have happened if the 
policy change had actually been made. 
A Simple Model 
As the basis for our discussion of alternative modeling 
strategies and possible uses of AGE models, we begin by 
sketching out the structure of a highly simplified static 
model. The model is of the type originally developed by 
Shoven and Whalley (1972). Consider a model of a single 
country. Imagine that we have data for all the interindus-
try transactions that take place in its economy for one year 
as well as all payments to factors of production and final 
demands for goods. Assembled in a matrix, such a data set 
is an input-output matrix of the sort originally developed 
by Leontief (1941). 
Table 1 contains a simple input-output matrix for the 
Mexican economy in 1989. All transactions have been ag-
gregated under the categories of three industrial sectors: 
primaries, manufactures, and services. These sectors are 
highly aggregated. The manufacturing sector, for example, 
lumps together such diverse goods as processed foods, 
textiles, and transportation equipment. A model designed 
to measure the potential impact on different industrial sec-
tors of a policy change like NAFTA would have a much 
finer disaggregation. 
All quantities in Table 1 are expressed in tens of tril-
lions of 1989 Mexican pesos. In 1989, the exchange rate 
between pesos and U.S. dollars averaged about 2,400 pe-
sos per dollar; for example, 350 trillion pesos in total pri-
vate consumption corresponded to about 146 billion dol-
lars. 
In an input-output matrix, the label on a column indi-
cates who made an expenditure, and the label on a row in-
dicates who received it. Reading down the second column 
of Table 1, for example, we see that in 1989, producers of 
manufacturing goods in Mexico purchased 40 trillion pe-
sos of intermediate inputs from producers of primaries and 
30 trillion pesos of imports. Reading across the second 
row, we see that private consumers purchased 110 trillion 
pesos of manufactures and that 40 trillion pesos of man-
ufactures were exported. The rows and columns of the ma-
trix in Table 1 are ordered so that the transactions break 
down into blocks: intermediate inputs, final demands, and 
components of the value added. The transactions reported 
in this input-output matrix are consistent with the figures 
in the national income account presented in Table 2, 
which records the Mexican gross domestic product (GDP) 
in 1989 as being 510 trillion pesos, or about 213 billion 
dollars. 
We construct a static AGE model by inventing artifi-
cial consumers, producers, a government, and foreigners 
who make the same transactions in the base case equilibri-
um of the computer economy as do their counterparts in 
the world. With a large amount of data (for example, a 
time series of input-output matrices), we could use statisti-
cal estimation techniques to find the parameters that char-
acterize the people in the artificial economy (Jorgenson 
1984). 
A more common method for constructing an AGE 
model is to calibrate its parameters (Mansur and Whalley 
1984). Using simple functional forms, we work backward 
from the data in Table 1 to construct economic agents 
whose transactions duplicate those observed. 
To understand the uses of this sort of model and the 
procedure used to calibrate it, consider a highly simplified 
model in which all consumers are identical. To further sim-
plify the model, let us aggregate the spending and income 
of die government with those of the consumers and con-
sider a single representative consumer. At this stage, we 
model the foreign sector not as a separate economic agent 
but as a production activity with exports as inputs and im-
ports as outputs. We later discuss how to model foreign 
trade in a more sophisticated way. In this economy, six 
goods are produced: primaries, manufactures, services, an 
investment good, a government consumption good, and an 
import good. Each of these goods is produced using inter-
mediate inputs of the other goods and two factors of pro-
duction: labor and capital. 
We assume that the consumer solves a utility-maximi-
zation problem of the form 
(1) max u(cl9c2,c3,c4,c5,c6) 
subject to 
(2) pici < (l-x)(wl+rk) + T. 
In the utility function, cl9 c2, and c3 are the quantities of 
primaries, manufactures, and services purchased; c4 is the 
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Input-Output Matrix for Mexico 
In 10 Trillion 1989 Mexican Pesos 
Expenditures 
Intermediate Inputs Final Demands 
Receipts  Primaries  Manufactures  Services 
Private 
Consumption  Investment 
Government 
Consumption  Exports 
Total 
Demand 
Intermediate  Primaries  1  4  0  2  0  0  1  8 
Inputs 
Manufactures  1  8  2  11  8  1  4  35 
Services  1  5  5  21  2  2  2  38 
Imports  0  3  1  1  2  0  1  8 
Components  Wages & Salaries  1  4  7  1  13 
of the Value 
Added  Other Factor Payments  4  10  19  —  —  0  —  33 
Indirect Taxes & Tariffs  0  1  4  —  —  0  —  5 
Total Production  8  35  38  35  12  4  8  140 
Source of basic data: Instituto National de Estadlstica, Geografia e Informatica 
quantity of the investment good; c5 is the quantity of the 
government consumption good; and c6 is the quantity of 
the import good. In the budget constraint, pl is the price of 
good i, w and r the wage rate and capital rental rate, / and 
k the consumer's endowments of labor and capital, x the 
direct tax rate, and T a transfer payment that is equal to 
the government's income. We put purchases of the invest-
ment good into the utility function to account for the sav-
ings observed in the data. In a dynamic model, consumers 
save so that they can enjoy future consumption, and pur-
chases of the investment good in one period augment the 
capital stock in the next. In this type of static model, how-
ever, investment is treated as another final demand for 
goods, like consumption. A simple form for the utility 
function is linear in logarithms: 
(3) M(c1,C2,C3,C4,C5,C6)
 = YHjMvtc). 
Here, the numbers 0, are nonnegative parameters, the cali-
bration of which we will describe later. 
We assume that each of the six produced goods has a 
production function that combines intermediate inputs in 
fixed proportions and labor and capital with substitution 
possibilities governed by a Cobb-Douglas productionfunc-
tion of the form (5k
al
x~°".
 The general form of the total pro-
duction function is 
(4) yj = mm(xlj/ay,x2j/a2j,...,x6j/a6j$jkplj~aj). 
Here, xtJ is the intermediate input of good i used in the pro-
duction of good j; atj is the amount of good / required to 
produce one unit of good j; and aijf p., and a; are parame-
ters to be calibrated. 
Not every good is used in the production of every 
other good. We handle this problem by dropping the cor-
responding entry from the production function, rather than 
by adopting complicated conventions about dividing by 
zero, and so on. The production function for manufac-
tures, for example, is 
(5) y2 = min(x12/a12,x22/a22^32/a32,x62/a62,p2/:2
2/2~
a2)-
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Both x42 and x52 are omitted here because Table 1 shows 
that neither the investment good nor the government con-
sumption good is used in the production of manufactures. 
Similarly, the production function for the import good is 
(6) = rmn(xl6/al6,x26/a26,x36/a36,x46/a46). 
Both k6 and /6 are omitted here because, in keeping with 
the accounting conventions used in Table 1, we consider 
imports to be produced by selling a combination of ex-
ports rather than by any process that involves labor and 
capital directly: commercial markups, transportation costs, 
and so on, are already included in the intermediate input of 
services in the exports column. 
We assume that producers minimize costs and earn zero 
after-tax profits. Since this assumption implies that pro-
ducers never waste inputs, we can write die production 
function for manufactures, for example, as 






Cost minimization further implies that k2, l2 solve 
(8) min wl2 + rk2 
subject to 
(9) pr2n\^>y2. 
Again, w is the wage rate, and r is the capital rental rate. 
Our assumption that after-tax profits equal zero is 
(10) (1 -t2)p2y2 - E^m-2^2 " " = 0. 
Here, t2 is the indirect tax rate on sales of manufactures. 
All these elements of the computer economy are linked 
by the concept of equilibrium. An equilibrium is specified 
by listing values for all of the endogenous variables in the 
model: a price for each of the produced goods pjf a level of 
consumption for each good cjf a wage rate w, a capital 
rental rate r, a production plan for each of the produced 
goods (SiJcy Jc2j,...,x6j,kj,/y), and a level of government tax 
receipts f. To be an equilibrium, such a list must satisfy the 
following properties: 
• The consumption vector (cvc2,...,c6) solves the utility-
maximization problem subject to the budget constraint 
described in equations (1) and (2). 
• The production plan {yjfxXjyx2j,...,x6j,kjyty
 minimizes 
Table 2 
National Income Accounts for Mexico 
In 10 Trillion 1989 Mexican Pesos 
Expenditures  Income 
Private Consumption  35  Wages and Salaries  13 
Private Investment  7  Other Factor Payments  33 
Government Consumption  4  Indirect Taxes and Tariffs  5 
Government Investment  5 
Exports  8 
- Imports  -8 
Gross Domestic Product  51  Gross Domestic Product  51 
Government Accounts  Foreign Accounts 
Government Consumption  4  Imports  8 
Government Investment  5  - Exports  -8 
-Indirect Taxes and Tariffs  -5 
- Direct Taxes  -2 
Government Deficit  2  Trade Deficit  0 
Source of basic data: Instituto Nacional de Estadfstica, Geografia e Informatica 
costs subject to the feasibility constraints and earns 
zero after-tax profits as described in (8), (9), and (10). 
• Supply equals demand in the market for each pro-
duced good: 
(11) yi = q + Y,jJij 
for i = 1,2,6. 
• Supply equals demand in each factor market: 
(12) I=RJ 
(B) k=rjr 
• The transfer to the consumer equals total tax receipts: 
(14) f = x(whrk)^Yfll
tM' 
5 Calibration and Simulation 
We calibrate the parameters of the computer economy so 
that the equilibrium reproduces the transactions observed 
in the data. We start with the representative consumer. Ta-
ble 2 reports that this consumer receives a factor income 
of 46 (460 trillion pesos)—13 in wages and salaries from 
selling labor services and 33 from other factor payments. 
As is standard practice in this sort of work, we aggregate 
these other factors into a single factor called capital. Table 
2 reports that the consumer pays 2 in direct taxes, leaving 
a disposable income of 44. Of this disposable income, 35 
is spent on consumption and the residual, 9, is saved. Re-
member, however, that we have decided to lump govern-
ment income and expenditures in with those of the con-
sumer. This representative consumer therefore spends an 
additional 4 on government consumption and receives an 
additional 7 as a transfer, which is equal to government tax 
receipts. Notice that savings is now equal to 12, which 
equals both income minus consumption expenditures (12 = 
44 + 7-35-4) and total expenditures on the investment 
good. 
If we use calculus to solve the consumer's problem de-
scribed in (1) and (2), we obtain 
(15) c-e^l-T)(wl+rk) + T]/p, 
(We have normalized the parameters 9, to sum to one.) 
We could think of each of the goods as being measured 
in some type of natural unit: primaries in terms of liters, 
for example, or labor services in terms of hours. Let us 
choose different physical units for the goods, such that 
one unit of each good is worth 10 trillion 1989 pesos. This 
choice of units is already implicit in the construction of 
Table 1, where, for example, apples and oranges have been 
aggregated into the primaries good. One advantage of these 
units is that we can calibrate the prices pit the wage w, and 
the capital rental rate r to all equal one in the base case 
equilibrium. (Think of these variables as price indexes, 
which are naturally set equal to one in the base case.) 
The calibration is now straightforward. Since we know 
that labor income is 13, we calibrate I = 13; since we know 
that capital income is 33, we calibrate k = 33; and since 
we know that direct tax payment on private income of 46 
is 2, we calibrate T = 2/46. Of the total after-tax income 
of 51 = (1-t)(wl+ric) + Ty we know that 2 is spent on pri-
maries. We therefore calibrate = 2/51, for example. 
Similarly, we calibrate 95 = 4/51 to get the consumer to 
spend 4 on government consumption in the base case equi-
librium. 
The calibration of the unit input requirements atJ in the 
production functions is equally easy. Since we know that 
4 units of primaries are required to produce 35 units of 
manufactures, we calibrate an - 4/35. Calibrating the 
Cobb-Douglas function that describes how labor and capi-
tal are combined to produce value added is slightly more 
complicated. If we choose inputs of labor and capital to 
minimize costs, we know that the ratio of the marginal 
products should equal the factor price ratio: 
(16) (l-og/:2/(a2/2) = w/r. 
Since we want k2 = 10 and /2 = 4 in the base case equilib-
rium and we have chosen units so that w = r - 1, we cali-
brate = 5/7. Inserting this value for c^ into the Cobb-
Douglas production function along with the observed val-
ues of labor, capital, and output, we obtain 
(17) fc = y2/(k^) = 35(10)"
5/7(4)-
2/7. 
Since producers of manufactures pay indirect taxes of 1 
on total sales of 35, we calibrate the indirect tax rate t2 = 
1/35. 
We can calibrate the production functions for other sec-
tors similarly. The production function for primaries, for 
example, is 





and the production function for the import good is 
(19) j6 = Sxl6 = 8 X2(JA = 8x36/2 = 8^. 
If we calibrate the model as above, we can use it to 
evaluate a change in government policy. We simply 
change a tax parameter, say t2, and then calculate the new 
equilibrium. In general, the values of all of the endoge-
nous variables change, and reporting on how some of them 
change is informative. When we report on the prices of 
produced goods and factors, we need to be explicit about 
the normalization. Like any general equilibrium model, 
this model allows for an arbitrary choice of a numeraire, 
that is, the unit in terms of which all values are expressed. 
(Looking at the definition of equilibrium, we see that mul-
tiplying pj, w, ry and T by the same positive constant still 
results in an equilibrium.) A typical practice is to normal-
ize prices so that a certain price index remains constant. 
We could, for example, normalize prices according to a 
price index based on consumption weights, 
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(20) E
6e,P, = i. 
*—=1 
Changes in the wage rate would then be termed changes 
in the real wage rate. 
One of the most interesting results to report is how con-
sumer welfare changes. Since utility is expressed in no 
natural units, economists often choose to measure welfare 
using an index based on income. A common measure of 
welfare is how much income the consumer would need, 
when faced with the base case prices, to achieve the same 
level of utility as in the simulation. Changes in this mea-
sure of welfare are called the equivalent variation. 
Additions to the Simple Model 
In calibrating both the consumer and the producers in our 
simple model, we have used either Cobb-Douglas or fixed-
proportions functions, and therefore all elasticities of sub-
stitution are equal to one or infinity. (The utility function 
is the logarithm of a Cobb-Douglas function.) If informa-
tion is available on elasticities of substitution in consump-
tion or production, however, it can easily be incorporated 
into the calibration procedure. Suppose, for example, that 
we have information from econometric estimates that the 
elasticity of substitution in consumption is 1/2. Then we 









where a = 1/2 is the elasticity of substitution. Again, we 
calibrate by working backward from the solution to the 
utility-maximization problem, 
(22) c,- = Q°[(\-T)(wl+ric) + T]/(j^JP^fy 
We obtain, for example, the parameter for primaries 0, = 
4/727 and the parameter for government consumption 05 = 
16/727. 
Even if we allow for more flexible functional forms, 
the model that we have described is highly simplified. In 
practice, static AGE models allow more disaggregation, 
more institutional details, and some market imperfections. 
Models used in policy analysis typically include many 
more production sectors. They may also include different 
types of consumer groups, and factors of production may 
be disaggregated. For example, labor might be broken 
down by skill level. Unfortunately, data restrictions usual-
ly prevent any simple breakdown of the aggregate capital 
input. 
In models that focus on public finance issues, more de-
tail usually goes into specifying government tax, transfer, 
and subsidy systems. Such models also separate govern-
ment and private spending decisions, treating the govern-
ment as a separate consumer. Government deficits can then 
be modeled as sales of goods called bonds by the govern-
ment to the other consumers. These bonds are regarded by 
consumers as perfect substitutes for the investment good 
in their savings decisions. Models that focus on trade is-
sues, such as those used to analyze the impact of NAFTA 
and discussed elsewhere in this issue, include more details 
on tariffs and quotas. These models may also allow for 
trade surpluses or deficits by introducing sales or purchas-
es of the investment good by the foreign sector. (For ex-
planations of the various ways to model government and 
trade deficits, see Kehoe and Serra-Puche 1983 and Kehoe 
et al. 1988.) Other models permit the government to set 
some prices and quantities. 
A market imperfection often built into a static AGE 
model is in the labor market. The real wage, specified in 
terms of an index of other prices, is typically modeled as 
being downwardly rigid. Changes in the demand for labor 
result in varying rates of unemployment. If demand for la-
bor rises so much that full employment occurs, the real 
wage then rises so that supply is equal to demand. (See 
Kehoe and Serra-Puche 1983.) Another possibility is to fix 
the return to capital. Then the interpretation involves not 
unemployment of capital but rather international capital 
flows. If demand for capital rises, an inflow from the rest 
of the world occurs. If demand for capital falls, an outflow 
occurs. 
Foreign Trade and the Armington Specification 
One of the most significant departures from our simple 
model structure that was taken by models used to analyze 
NAFTA involves the treatment of foreign trade. An obvi-
ous way to model foreign trade is to put a number of sin-
gle-country models together and let them interact. Another 
way, which is frequently found in both theoretical and ap-
plied work, simplifies matters by assuming that the coun-
try under consideration is so small that it cannot affect the 
determination of equilibrium in the rest of the world. Em-
ploying this small-country assumption, we can treat for-
eign prices as exogenous and deal with what is, in effect, 
a single-country model. 
Whether we use a multicountry or a single-country 
model, we must decide whether goods in the same indus-
trial category in different countries are regarded by con-
sumers and producers as identical. A specification typical 
7 of many AGE trade models is to distinguish goods by in-
dustry and by country of origin. Thus, for example, an 
American-produced automobile is a different good from 
a Japanese-produced automobile—a close but imperfect 
substitute. 
This specification, named the Armington (1969) speci-
fication after the economist who invented it, has three ad-
vantages over obvious alternatives for matching the model 
to data on trade flows. One is that it accounts for the large 
amount of cross-hauling present in the data, where a coun-
try both imports and exports goods of the same product 
category. In a model where goods are homogeneous, cross-
hauling does not exist. Another advantage of this specifi-
cation is that it explains the empirical observation that 
even at a very disaggregated level, most countries produce 
goods in all product categories. In models where goods 
are not distinguished by country of origin and produced 
goods exceed factors of production, countries typically 
specialize in the production of a limited number of goods. 
Still another advantage of the Armington specification is 
that it allows for differing degrees of substitution among 
domestic and imported goods across different products 
and allows for changes in the relative prices of different 
imported goods. Empirical studies indicate that both of 
these phenomena are found in time series data. (See, for 
example, Shiells, Stern, and Deardorff 1986.) Neither is 
possible in a model that aggregates all imports together or 
in a model that treats domestic and imported goods as per-
fect substitutes. 
Another approach, based on theoretical work by Dixit 
and Stiglitz (1977) and Ethier (1982), goes one step fur-
ther than the Armington specification and distinguishes a 
good not by its country of origin but by the firm that pro-
duces it. Thus, as a good, a Ford automobile differs from 
both a Chrysler and a Toyota. As we explain next, differ-
entiating goods by firm necessarily requires modeling 
firms as imperfect competitors. In contrast, differentiating 
goods by country is not inherently linked to imperfect 
competition, although imperfect competition is often found 
in models that employ the Armington specification. 
To calibrate a model that employs the Armington spec-
ification, we need to arrange the data slightly differently 
than they are arranged in Table 1. The imports there are 
classified by the sector that purchases them, the sector of 
destination, and not by the sector that produces them, the 
sector of origin. In the manufactures column, for example, 
the entry of 3 in the imports row indicates total purchases 
of 30 trillion pesos worth of imports of all types by the 
manufactures sector, not total imports of 30 trillion pesos 
of manufactures. Suppose that we use a different input-
output matrix in which imports are classified by sector of 
origin and find that the value of imports of manufactures 
in 1989 was 5. Suppose, too, that we have econometric 
evidence that the elasticity of substitution between domes-
tic manufactures and imported manufactures was 3/2. We 
can then use this information to calibrate an Armington 
aggregator that combines domestic and imported manu-
factures to produce an aggregate manufactured good that 
is then used as an intermediate input by the production sec-
tors, consumed by private consumers or the government, 
invested, or exported: 
(23) >>2 = y2[ + (l-62)^r^-i>. 
Here, y2 is the aggregate of manufactures, y2d is domestic 
production of manufactures, and y2fis imports. Solving the 
problem of minimizing the cost of the aggregate good and 
inserting a2 = 3/2, = 40, y2d = 35, and we can cal-
ibrate 82 = 7
2/3/(l+7
/3)
 and y2 = (l+7
2/3)
3/64.
 We can simi-
larly construct Armington aggregators for primaries and 
services. 
Many models employ the Armington specification in 
single-country models. A common way to use this specifi-
cation is to model the domestic economy as a small coun-
try (one that takes prices and incomes in the rest of the 
world as exogenous). This assumption is not, however, the 
simple small-country assumption of the traditional trade 
theory that assumes no product differentiation. According 
to the Armington specification, domestic goods are differ-
ent goods from foreign goods, which allows the prices of 
domestic goods to vary and gives even the smallest coun-
try some market power. (Of course, the higher the substi-
tutability between domestic and foreign goods, the lower 
the flexibility for such fluctuations.) Cox and Harris (1985) 
refer to this combination of modeling the determination of 
foreign prices and incomes as exogenous and modeling do-
mestic and foreign goods as imperfect substitutes as the al-
most small-country assumption. This assumption allows us 
to analyze trade issues in what is essentially a single-coun-
try model but makes the model something less than a full 
general equilibrium model in which all relevant variables 
are determined endogenously. 
In our simple model, the easiest way to introduce the 
almost small-country assumption is to specify a foreign 
consumer who solves the utility-maximization problem 
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Here, xid is the foreign consumer's consumption of the do-
mestic good /, or domestic exports of that good; xifis con-
sumption of the foreign good; ptj is the price of the for-
eign good; e is a real exchange rate that corresponds to 
the price of the import good in the simple model; and If is 
foreign income. The reciprocal of e is often referred to as 
the domestic country's terms of trade. 
A typical specification is to assume that foreign income 
Ifmd prices of foreign goods pif are exogenous. The mod-
el is then closed by letting the real exchange rate e adjust 
so as to keep trade balanced—the total value of exports 
equals the total value of imports. 
The general equilibrium interpretation of this specifica-
tion is that the foreign consumer is endowed with a fixed 
amount of one of the foreign goods and has access to a 
production technology that can transform this good into 
any of the other foreign goods in fixed proportions. The 
fixed proportions and profit maximization guarantee that 
the relative prices of the foreign goods are fixed in equilib-
rium. The real exchange rate e is now the price of the for-
eign good with which the foreign consumer is endowed. 
Modifications 
The simple model in the previous section has constant re-
turns in production and perfect competition among produc-
ers. This was the dominant model in early AGE analyses 
of trade policy. (See, for example, Srinivasan and Whalley 
1986.) Over the past decade, however, the trend in both 
theoretical and applied work on trade has been to incor-
porate such phenomena as increasing returns to scale as 
well as imperfect competition and product differentiation. 
We will now explore the various ways that these phenom-
ena can be included in our simple model. 
Increasing Returns 
The first AGE model to include increasing returns along 
with imperfect competition was developed by Harris 
(1984) to analyze the impact on Canada of the then-pro-
posed U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement (FTA). Harris 
was motivated by empirical work on Canadian manufac-
turing, in particular, that of Eastman and Stykolt (1966). 
They argue that protection in a small economy like Cana-
da restricts market size and limits foreign competition in 
certain industries, promoting many firms which operate at 
scales that are too small in terms of economic efficiency. 
Harris (1984) and Cox and Harris (1985) show that by in-
corporating increasing returns and imperfect competition 
into some industrial sectors of an AGE model, they can 
capture these effects and thereby identify a much larger 
impact on Canada of an FTA with the United States. This 
research played an important role in the political debate in 
Canada leading up to approval of the agreement. 
To show how Harris' model incorporates increasing re-
turns and imperfect competition, we will explain how to 
build these features into the manufactures sector of our 
simple model while keeping the primaries and services 
sectors competitive. We begin by considering the produc-
tion function for an individual manufacturing firm. (In the 
model with constant returns, delineation of individual 
firms is not important; with increasing returns, it is.) We 
split the inputs required to produce a certain amount of 
output into two categories: variable inputs and fixed in-
puts. We assume, as do all the modelers whose work is 
discussed here and in the other article in this issue, that 
variable inputs are proportional to output. These variable 
inputs include all of the intermediate inputs and some of 
the labor and capital inputs. Some of the labor and capital 
inputs, however, are fixed, and these fixed inputs are re-
quired to operate the firm at any level of output except ze-
ro, where the firm shuts down. 
To make the distinction between variable inputs and 
fixed inputs concrete, let us abstract away from foreign 
trade, intermediate inputs, and substitution possibilities be-
tween capital and labor and consider a technology that 
uses only one input: labor. We write the production func-
tion for manufacturing firm i as 
(26) y2i = (l/a)max(/2-/0). 
Here, y2i is the output, l2i is the labor input, a is the vari-
able amount of labor required per unit of output, and/is 
the fixed amount of labor required to operate the firm. Ac-
cording to this function,/units of labor are required to pro-
duce any output at all and, after the fixed-labor require-
ment has been met, each additional unit of labor results in 
1 /a units of output. In the more general framework, with 
intermediate goods and capital, the production function 
would be something like 
(27) y2i - mm[xni/al2,x22i/a22,x32i/a32, 
maxfakftl^-f,0)1 
9 Imperfect Competition 
and Product Differentiation 
In contrast to the perfect competition described in the sim-
ple model, imperfect competition and product differentia-
tion can be specified in several ways, each involving dif-
ferent assumptions about firms' behavior. Harris (1984) 
uses variants of two different sets of assumptions: Cournot 
competition with homogeneous products and Eastman-
Stykolt collusive behavior. Each set of assumptions is 
coupled with the Armington specification, which as we 
have seen, differentiates goods by country of origin. 
Studying the impact of the U.S.-Canada FTA, Brown and 
Stern (1989), like Harris (1984), use yet a third set of as-
sumptions: Cournot competition with differentiated prod-
ucts. Since the assumptions vary in each model and lead 
to varying results, we describe each set of assumptions in 
detail. 
Table 3 lays out the different modeling options that we 
will discuss. Models with no product differentiation are 
common in traditional trade theory but rare in applications 
because of the problems created by the possibility of com-
plete specialization and the inability of models without 
product differentiation to account for cross-hauling. The 
modeling options listed in Table 3 do not exhaust all pos-
sible specifications. The Cournot competition specification, 
in which imperfectly competitive firms take the quantity 
decisions of other firms as given, for example, could be re-
placed by a Bertrand competition specification, in which 
firms take price decisions as given. Since Bertrand compe-
tition is rarely found in AGE models, however, this speci-
fication is not discussed here. 
• Cournot Competition 
With Homogeneous Products 
Suppose that n firms produce manufactures. Also, sup-
pose, as does Harris (1984), that the goods produced by 
all the firms in a sector are identical. In a highly simpli-
fied framework with no foreign trade, no intermediate 
goods, no capital, and a representative consumer with the 
same utility function as in the previous section, the de-
mand function faced by the manufacturing firms would be 
(28) c2 = 02//p2. 
Here, I is the representative consumer's disposable income, 
I = (1-T)wl + T, which we assume that the firms take as 
given. Imposing the condition that supply, y2i, is equal 
to demand, c2, we can invert this function to derive the re-
Table 3 
Modeling Options 
Product Differentiation  Market Structure  Trade Specification 
No Differentiation  Perfect Competition  Small Country 
or Cournot  or Multicountry 
Differentiation by Country  Perfect Competition  Almost Small 
(Armington)  or Cournot  Country 
or Eastman-Stykolt  or Multicountry 
Differentiation by Firm  Cournot  Multicountry 
(Dixit-Stiglitz/Ethier) 
lationship between the price of manufactures and the out-
put of firms: 
(29) p2 = ^l/Yjif 
The Cournot specification assumes that the individual 
manufacturing firm chooses output y2i to maximize profits, 
taking the output of the other firms as given: 
(30) max (e,//^?^/ " % "/• 
The first term, p2y2i, is the revenue of firm i; the second, 
ay2i, is its variable costs; and the third,/, its fixed costs. 
Using calculus to solve this problem and employing the 
symmetry of cost and demand conditions across firms to 
set all y2i equal to y2, we obtain the familiar Lerner condi-
tion that marginal cost equals marginal revenue: 
(31) a = [ 1 - (1 /n)]02//(ny2). 
Here, the marginal cost, a, equals the price, 92II(ny2), mul-
tiplied by one minus the reciprocal of the elasticity of de-
mand faced by the firm, which in this case is n. 
The elasticity e used in the Lerner condition a = [1 -
(l/e)]p2 is frequently referred to as the firm's perceived 
elasticity of demand. If a firm actually changed its output 
level, many other variables would change in equilibrium, 
even if all the other manufacturing firms kept their output 
levels constant. In particular, consumer income and the 
prices of other goods would change. (With a more general 
consumer utility function, demand for manufactures would 
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depend on these other prices.) Taking these general equi-
librium feedbacks of a quantity change into account is a 
complex technical matter; the feedbacks may even prevent 
an equilibrium from existing in the model. Since these 
feedbacks are usually presumed to be small if individual 
firms are small relative to the economy as a whole, they 
are generally ignored both in theory and in practice. 
To use the Lerner condition to determine the price of 
manufactures, we must determine the number of firms in 
the manufactures sector, a?. If we assume free entry and 
exit of firms in this sector, then the number of firms ad-
justs so that profits equal zero. To determine n, we use 
the profit-maximization condition to solve for _y2 and p2 as 
functions of n, 
(32) j2 = Q2I(n-l)/(an
2) 
(33) p2 = an/(n-l) 
and then insert these formulas into the condition that prof-
its equal zero: 
(34) Q2I/n - Q2I(n-\)/n
2 -/= 0 
(35) n = (9 2I/f)
m. 
In general equilibrium calculations, of course, consumer 
income varies endogenously, but the above equations com-
pletely describe the pricing and output decisions of man-
ufacturing firms and the number of such firms. Similar but 
more complicated expressions describe the corresponding 
relationships in the more general model. 
When calibrating an AGE model with imperfect com-
petition to reproduce a base case data set, we can always 
specify that n is an integer. A potential problem with sim-
ulations, however, is that the number emerging from this 
calculation need not be an integer. Modelers usually deal 
with this problem by simply ignoring it and reporting 
whatever number emerges. 
• Eastmari-Stykolt Collusive Behavior 
Harris (1984) considers an alternative to the Cournot spec-
ification that he calls the Eastman-Stykolt assumption. 
Rather than deriving firms' actions as solutions to maxi-
mization problems, the Eastman-Stykolt assumption states 
simply that the domestic price for a good should equal the 
foreign price multiplied by one plus the domestic tariff. 
This assumption is based on evidence found by Eastman 
and Stykolt (1966) that prices in Canadian manufacturing 
tended to equal the U.S. prices for similar goods, with ad-
justments for tariff protection. Harris thinks that the East-
man-Stykolt assumption is fairly appropriate for a small 
country. He uses the empirical evidence of Eastman and 
Stykolt to justify the assumption that Canadian firms col-
lude in setting prices because they regard the tariff-adjust-
ed price of U.S. goods as a sort of focal point, a high 
price that is easy to monitor and adjust to. 
In our simple example, the Eastman-Stykolt assump-
tion states that 
(36) p2d = (1 +t2)p2f. 
Here, p2d is the domestic price of manufactures, t2 is the 
tariff, and p2f is the foreign price of manufactures, which, 
as we have mentioned, is exogenous. Unlike with the 
Cournot specification, we cannot ignore foreign trade in 
explaining the role of the Eastman-Stykolt assumption. 
Let us therefore construct Armington aggregators for pri-
maries, manufactures, and services. With a utility function 
that is linear in the logarithms of the three Armington ag-
gregates, savings, and government consumption, we can 
then derive total consumer demand for domestic manufac-
tures by solving the utility-maximization problem 
(37) max J^JM^' + {l^^Y*^ 
+ 94log(c4) + 95log(c5) 
subject to 
(
38) Yj]=l[PidCid + + PACA + Psc5 ^ L 
Here, cid is consumer demand for the domestic version of 
good i, and cif is consumer demand for the imported ver-
sion. 
Using calculus to solve the consumer's utility-maximi-
zation problem, imposing the Eastman-Stykolt assumption 
in the manufactures sector, and adding the demand for do-
mestic manufactures by foreigners, we obtain total demand 
for domestic manufactures y2d. Since we know the price 
(1 +t2)p2f, we can use the zero-profit condition (which 
equates price and average costs) to determine average firm 
output y2: 
(39) (1 +t2)p2f = a+f/y2 
(40) y2=f/[(l+t2)p2f-a]. 
This calculation is illustrated in the average cost curve di-
ll agram in the accompanying chart. Notice that eliminating 
the tariff, t2, would cause the domestic price to fall from 
(l+t2)p2f to p2f and the output of the typical firm to rise 
from y2 to y2. 
We must still determine the number of firms. To do so, 
we simply divide the expression for total demand by the 
expression for average firm output: 
(41) n=y2d/y2. 
A frequent outcome of tariff reductions is that, although 
total output increases to supply the increased demand re-
sulting from the price reduction, the number of firms de-
creases. This increase in total output, coupled with the de-
crease in the number of firms, is referred to as rationaliza-
tion. 
Although a tariff reduction would cause a similar ratio-
nalization under the Cournot competition specification, the 
effects would not be as large as those under the Eastman-
Stykolt assumption. The Eastman-Stykolt assumption leads 
to a price reduction equal to the tariff reduction, as in the 
chart. Consider the case of a tariff reduction in a model 
with both the Cournot and Armington specifications: Do-
mestic producers are faced with more competition from 
abroad but are not forced to lower their prices by the full 
amount of the tariff reduction because imports are imper-
fect substitutes for domestic products. (In a model with 
homogeneous products, of course, the domestic price 
would always have to equal the import price, provided 
that the specific product is imported—not exported.) 
Cox and Harris (1985) regard the Eastman-Stykolt as-
sumption as an extreme case. Since the Armington speci-
fication implies that an imported good is an imperfect sub-
stitute for a domestic good, this assumption of one price 
for both goods is not the obvious law of one price that it 
appears. Rather, the Eastman-Stykolt assumption embod-
ies the idea that the price of an imported good is a focal 
point for collusion among domestic producers. 
As a practical way of combining the Eastman-Stykolt 
assumption with the Cournot specification, Cox and Harris 
simply average the two: 
(42) Pld=x(\+t2)p2f+(1-ami - mi 
Here, X is the relative weight placed on the Eastman-
Stykolt assumption, a measure of the degree of collusion 
among firms, and 1 - X is the relative weight placed on 
the Lerner condition, a measure of the degree of competi-
tion among firms. 
The Impact of Eliminating a Tariff 
Under the Eastman-Stykolt Assumption 
Output 
• Cournot Competition 
With Differentiated Products 
In contrast to Cox and Harris (1985), Brown and Stem 
(1989) present a model that treats economic behavior in 
all of the countries in the model as endogenous. They also 
abandon the Armington specification for all goods pro-
duced by imperfectly competitive firms. Instead, Brown 
and Stem model goods as being differentiated by the firm 
that produces the goods, following the monopolistic com-
petition theory formalized by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) and 
described next. Modeling goods as differentiated by firm 
rather than by country has become popular in theoretical 
models (Ethier 1982, Helpman and Krugman 1985). This 
method of modeling also reduces a country's monopoly 
power (which even a small country is assumed to have, 
according to the Armington specification) over the supply 
of its own goods. In an applied model, this monopoly pow-
er can generate perverse results (Brown 1987). 
The monopolistic competition theory with differentiated 
products can be explained easily in the context of our sim-
ple model with no intermediate goods, one factor of pro-
duction, and, for the time being, no foreign trade. We sup-




12 Patrick J. Kehoe, Timothy J. Kehoe 
A Primer on Static AGE Models 
Here, p (where 0 < p < 1) is a parameter that controls 
taste for variety and is equal to (o-1)/g, where a is the 
elasticity of substitution between goods. As long as this 
elasticity is finite (so that p < 1), this function embodies 
the idea that consumers regard goods produced by differ-
ent firms as imperfect substitutes and prefer variety. If the 
elasticity is infinite (so that p = 1), however, goods pro-
duced by different firms are perfect substitutes and the 
model with monopolistic competition reduces to the Cour-
not competition specification with homogeneous products 
described above. 
Solving the consumer utility-maximization problem, we 
can derive an inverse demand function that describes a re-
lation between the price of the good produced by firm i and 
the demand for all of the goods: 
(44) fti = 02/c£-
I/E".I^-
We assume, as before, that firms follow the Cournot speci-
fication, choosing output to maximize profits and taking 
the output of other firms and consumer income as given. 
Imposing the condition that supply, y2i, is equal to demand, 
c2i, we obtain the problem 
(45) max falyfr
1/^J^i " <%, "/• 
Once again, we can solve this problem and then impose 
symmetry across firms to obtain the Lerner condition: 
(46) a = [1 - (n+p-pn)/n]Q2I/(ny2). 
Here, as before, a is the marginal cost and Q2I/(ny2) is the 
price, but now the elasticity of demand is n/(n+p-pn\ 
which is less than n as long as p < 1 and n > 1. In other 
words, introducing product differentiation lowers the elas-
ticity of demand faced by individual firms. We finish spec-
ifying the model with monopolistic competition by allow-
ing free entry and exit and using the zero-profit condition 
to determine the number of firms. 
In principle, foreign trade should not greatly complicate 
this model. With foreign trade, markets exist for the goods 
in every country of the model and tariffs or other trade bar-
riers may be imposed that affect the expressions for price, 
output, and the number of firms. A foreign firm is consid-
ered a competitor just like any other. Unfortunately, a com-
plication arises when we try to calibrate the model. The 
data show that domestic consumers tend to consume more 
products from domestic firms than they do from foreign 
firms. To bypass this problem, Brown and Stem (1989) 
add weights to the taste-for-variety function, with higher 
weights on domestic goods than on foreign goods: 
(47) [eaE^ + d -^IM* 
where nd is the number of domestic firms and nf, the num-
ber of foreign firms. Although this specification solves the 
calibration problem, it retreats back toward the Armington 
specification since consumers again regard foreign goods 
as different from domestic goods. 
An additional benefit can be found to putting different 
weights on domestic and foreign goods in the utility func-
tion. If consumers in each country put higher weights on 
domestic rather than foreign goods, then each country pro-
duces all types of goods in equilibrium. If consumers put 
equal weights on all goods, however, then the same possi-
bilities exist for complete specialization as exist in the 
model without product differentiation. (See Helpman and 
Krugman 1985.) That is, when the number of types of pro-
duced goods exceeds the number of production factors, 
countries usually specialize in a limited number of types of 
goods. Proponents of the trade models with product differ-
entiation often advertise its ability to account for intra-
industry trade. No intra-industry trade is possible, howev-
er, in industries with complete specialization. The model 
with product differentiation but not the Armington specifi-
cation guarantees that if two countries produce goods in 
the same industry, intra-industry trade exists—a possibility 
not accounted for in the model without product differenti-
ation. Nevertheless, the model with only product differen-
tiation does not guarantee that the two countries produce 
goods in all industries. 
Reliability 
Although a large amount of energy and resources has 
gone into constructing AGE models and using them to an-
alyze policy changes over the past two decades, relatively 
little has gone into evaluating the performance of these 
models after such policy changes have actually occurred. 
To trust the results of AGE models and even justify the 
effort put into constructing them, we would like to know 
that they really explain and, to some extent, predict the 
crucial changes that occur in an economy as a result of a 
policy change. 
One way to assess the reliability of an AGE model is to 
compare its predictions with actual outcomes. We should 
stress that these models predict how a given policy change 
would affect an economy if it were to experience no other 
policy changes or external shocks. To be fair to the pur-
13 pose of the models when evaluating their performance af-
ter a policy change, we would have to rerun them, includ-
ing any other significant policy changes or external shocks 
that had occurred. The AGE modelers of the U.S.-Canada 
FTA complain that comparing their predictions with the 
economic experience of the last several years is difficult 
because of the recession in both countries. Modelers of 
the U.S.-Canada FTA, such as Cox and Harris (1985) and 
Brown and Stern (1989), should rerun their models, how-
ever, taking explicit account of how the external shocks 
affected the United States and Canada in 1989 and after-
ward. 
Since no one has carried out this exercise with a model 
of the U.S.-Canada FTA, we report on a related exercise. 
This exercise was performed by Kehoe, Polo, and Sancho 
(forthcoming) on a static AGE model of the Spanish econ-
omy, which was built in 1984-85 to analyze Spain's 1986 
entry into the European Community. The first column of 
Table 4 shows the percentage changes in relative prices 
that actually occurred in Spain between 1985 and 1986. 
The second column shows the model's predictions. The 
prices have been deflated by an appropriate index so that 
a consumption-weighted average of the changes sums to 
zero. As we have seen, these types of models are designed 
to predict changes in relative prices, not those in price lev-
els. Notice that the model fares particularly badly in pre-
dicting the changes in the food and nonalcoholic beverages 
sector and in the transportation sector. Obvious historical 
explanations exist for these failings: in 1986, the interna-
tional price of petroleum fell sharply and poor weather 
caused an exceptionally bad harvest in Spain. Incorporat-
ing these two exogenous shocks into the model yields the 
results in the third column of Table 4, which correspond 
much more closely to the actual changes. Notice, for ex-
ample, that the weighted correlation between the model re-
sults and the actual changes is 0.94. 
Kehoe, Polo, and Sancho (forthcoming) perform simi-
lar exercises in comparing the results from simulations 
that both include and exclude the exogenous shocks with 
the actual data for changes in industrial prices, production 
levels, returns to factors of production, and major compo-
nents of GDP. In general, the original simulation is better 
at predicting the actual changes in these other variables 
than those in relative prices of consumption goods; the 
simulation where the model is adjusted for the fall in oil 
prices and the bad harvest does slightly worse. For each 
set of variables, however, a significantly positive correla-
tion exists between the model results and the actual 
Table 4 
Spanish Model's Predictions vs.The Data 
Percentage Change in Relative Price, 1985-86* 
Model 
Sector  Actual  Original  Adjusted 
1. Food and Nonalcoholic Beverages  1.8  -2.3  1.7 
2. Tobacco and Alcoholic Beverages  3.9  2.5  5.8 
3. Clothing  2.1  5.6  6.6 
4. Housing  -3.2  -2.2  -4.8 
5. Household Articles  .1  2.2  2.9 
6. Medical Services  -.7  -4.8  -4.2 
7. Transportation  -4.0  2.6  -6.6 
8. Recreation  -1.4  -1.3  .1 
9. Other Services  2.9  1.1  2.8 
Weighted Correlation With 1985-86t  1.000  -.079  .936 
*The change in the sectoral price index is deflated by an appropriate aggregate price index. 
tWeighted correlation coefficients are shown with actual changes in 1985-86. The weights used for each 
sector are (1) 0.2540, (2) 0.0242, (3) 0.0800, (4) 0.1636, (5) 0.0772, (6) 0.0376, (7) 0.1342, (8) 0.0675, 
and (9) 0.1617; these are the consumption shares in the model's benchmark year, which is 1980. 
Source: Kehoe, Polo, and Sancho, forthcoming 
changes, demonstrating that this sort of model can accu-
rately predict the changes in relative prices and resource 
allocation that result from a major policy change. When 
the exogenous shocks that affected the Spanish economy 
in 1986 are omitted, however, the model does not fare as 
well. 
The major policy change that occurred in Spain in 1986 
was a tax reform that converted most indirect taxes to a 
value-added tax, in accord with EC requirements. The pro-
cess of trade liberalization began in 1986 and is captured 
in the model. Unlike the modeling exercises presented here 
and in the other article in this issue, however, the work on 
Spain did not concentrate on trade issues involving increas-
ing returns and imperfect competition. Consequently, the 
results from the Spanish model do not help us much to 
discriminate among the various model structures previous-
ly discussed and those used in the other article in this issue, 
to analyze the impact of NAFTA. 
One way to evaluate these different modeling strategies 
would be to modify the Spanish model to incorporate al-
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ternative assumptions about product differentiation, returns 
to scale, and market structure. Alternative versions of the 
model could then be used to "predict" the impact of the 
trade liberalization that has occurred in Spain in recent 
years, and the results could be compared with the data. 
Similarly, the different models used to analyze the impact 
of NAFTA could be evaluated by using them to "predict" 
the impact of the policy changes and exogenous shocks 
that have buffeted the three North American economies 
over the past decade. In any case, now that NAFTA has 
been implemented, we will be able to tell, in less than a 
decade, which models were better at predicting NAFTA's 
effects. 
Although static AGE models like the Spanish model 
can accurately show how resources are reallocated across 
sectors as a result of tax or trade policy reform, this em-
phasis on sectoral detail has a cost. That cost is the exclu-
sion of phenomena that involve time and uncertainty, such 
as labor market adjustments, capital flows, and growth. 
For example, for Spain, one of the most significant im-
pacts of joining the EC was that foreign investment in-
creased. For the six years before Spain joined the EC in 
1986, that country averaged $1.5 billion per year in for-
eign investment; in the six years after it joined, Spain av-
eraged $12.8 billion (International Monetary Fund 1992). 
Static AGE models can analyze the sectoral impact of such 
capital flows, but they cannot accurately analyze the deter-
minants or predict the size of such flows. For that, a model 
must incorporate time and uncertainty in investment deci-
sions—in short, it must be dynamic. 
Concluding Remarks 
In this article, we have developed a fairly simple applied 
general equilibrium (AGE) model, extended that model, 
and then tested to see how well it predicted the economic 
changes caused by Spain's entry into the European Com-
munity. Our results seem to confirm that the strength of 
static AGE models lies in their ability to predict which in-
dustries will benefit and which will falter under such a 
policy change. Of course, as we noted during our discus-
sion of the Spanish example, these models also have some 
weaknesses; their inability to account for dynamic eco-
nomic phenomena is certainly primary among them. 
For a look at the application of static AGE models to 
a specific policy change or reform, turn to our other article 
in this issue. There, we examine how researchers have 
used static AGE models to attempt to predict the effects of 
the North American Free Trade Agreement on the econo-
mies of Canada, Mexico, and the United States. In that 
article, we also try to provide some insights into the po-
tential benefits of dynamically modeling the effects of this 
policy change. 
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